PREFACE

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible 4 s a m a Bin ade en'
The United States is at war with terrorism. The United States government must provide the intelligence community's analytical force with the necessary resources and capabilities in order to use intelligence analysis as an effective weapon in the War on Terrorism. Observers in and outside the intelligence community have recognized this and laid the groundwork for sound solutions to improve intelligence analysis in this and other areas. Many good ideas have surfaced regarding basic manning, training, and equipping the analytical force. Good intelligence analysis-adding context and meaning to the volumes of raw intelligence and information-will be critical to combating the terrorism problem. Reviewing the studies and programs in place to improve analysis demonstrates acknowledgement of the shortfall in resources and capabilities in the analytical field and the need for improvement. A logical next step is to adequately resource and enforce the plans to improve analysis-or to pay another price akin to the tragedies of September 1 lth.
Following each major terrorist act affecting U.S. citizens, the need for good terrorism analysis becomes painfully apparent. Immediately the intelligence community is cited for failure.
However, looking at the Congressional testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Defense intelligence Agency (DIA) in the spring of 2001, it is obvious that these two leaders, and the organizations they lead, provided predictive analysis that a terrorist incident on the scale of September 1lth would occur. In fact, VADM Thomas Wilson, USN, Director, DIA, testified that a terrorist incident of this caliber was his number one concern in global threats 
Key Near Term Concerns
While specific threats are impossible to predict, and new threats and challenges can arise almost without warning in today's environment, over the next 12-24 months, Iam most concerned about the following potential situations.
A major terrorist attack against United States interests, either here or abroad, perhaps with a weapon designed to produce mass casualties. Terrorism remains the 'asymmetric approach of choice' and many terrorist groups have both the capability and desire to harm us. Terrorism i s the most likely direct threat to U S interests worldwide. I will discuss the terrorist threat inmore detail a little later on.
...Terrorism remains the most significant asymmetric threat to our interests at home and abroad. This threat will grow as disgruntled groups and individuals focus on America as the source of their troubles. Most anti-US terrorism will be regional and based on perceived racial, ethnic or religious grievances. Terrorism will tend to occur in urban centers, often capitals. Our overseas military presence and our military's status as a symbol of US power, interests, and influence can make it a target. However, in many cases, increased security at US military and diplomatic facilities will drive terrorists to attack 'softer' targets such as private citizens or commercial interests.
The characteristics of the most effective terrorist organizations --highly compartmented operations planning, good cover and security, extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness -make them very difficult intelligence targets. Middle East-based terrorist groups will remain the most important threat, but our citizens, facilities, and interests will be targeted worldwide. State sponsors (primarily Iran) and individuals with the financial means (such as Usama bin Ladin) will continue to provide much of the economic and technological support needed by terrorists. A move toward 'higher-casualty attacks' is predictable as globalization provides terrorists access to more destructive conventional weapons technologies and WMD. MARCH 8,2001 Critics need to understand that analyzing the terrorism problem offers radically different challenges as compared to traditional state-focused analysis. Terrorist activities are not easily followed using traditional indicators such as in military force on force scenarios. ...there is the central, basic fact that terrorism is a highly secretive activity, involving plots hatched in small groups that are very suspicious of outsiders and ruthless toward anyone suspected of betraying them. This makes terrorism an extremely difficult target. In particular, it makes it hard to get the kind of highly specific information, including time, date, and place of planned attacks, that would be most useful in preventing terrorist operations. That is the kind of information that is usually known only to a small number of plotters, and it is the kind that we are only rarely able to ~b t a i n .~ Analysts cannot benefit from the same familiarization with their target that traditional regional analysts can. Forces officers, demonstrates the importance of the role of intelligence in the war on terrori~m.~ While the role of intelligence in terrorism analysis is clearly understood in predicting threats, the ancillary role in supporting law enforcement is often overlooked. lntelligence analysis is used to help determine responsibility for terrorist attacks already committed. The critics don't provide credit for these successes. For example, the intelligence community pulled together enough evidence within two weeks of the East African embassy bombings to pinpoint Osama Bin Laden's operatives as the culprits. lntelligence analysis also assisted in the successful location, tracking and capturing of over 50 terrorists (prior to September 1I th). One of the frustrations the intelligence community deals with is the inability to share all successes. This is particularly true when discussing thwarted terrorist plots.'0 Occasionally some of these successful operations, such as the plot in Seattle surrounding the millennium celebrations, make the news-but far more do not. It is satisfying to the analysts to be correct in warning.
However, it is human nature to be somewhat frustrated when continuously attacked by those in the media, government, and the public, who are unaware of how many successful attacks have been stopped by good analysis. It would be extremely difficult to use substantive criteria to determine the correct level for intelligence spending-it would have to be the nation's call.
Intelligence resources could probably be reduced without damaging national security if better business practices were adopted, better budget analysis conducted among agencies, and unnecessary requirements dropped.18
In 1996,'the only report of its kind on the street, essentially said the intelligence community could do more with less, if better organized. It was not a ringing endorsement for additional dollars for any part of the intelligence community, including analysis.
The "Report of the National Commission on Terrorism", or the "Bremer Commission" took a later, alternative view. This commission said that if the United States was to protect itself and remain a world leader, it must develop and refine &unterterrorism policies, including those involving resourcir5g. Recommendations included higher priority for funding for counterterrorism efforts by the CIA, NSA, and FBI, to continue operational activity and improve collection and contains an increase between $1.5 and $2 billion annually, a significant increase. The previous CIA annual budget was estimated at about $3.5 billion.24 It is unknown how much of that figure will be dedicated to the analytical portion of the budget, but the increase is at least better hope for assistance in an area of concern.
One way to look at the resource issue is in a U.S. military framework. If the intelligence community were viewed as the equivalent of a "service," such as the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps, the intelligence community would have the responsibility to man, train, and equip its force by law under U.S. Code, Title 10. The intelligence community understands these responsibilities and demonstrates significant efforts to improve in these areas, despite a resource-constrained environment.
MANNING: THE ANALYST
The intelligence community needs good analysts to attack the terrorism problem. The community must build and maintain subject matter experts who have continuity, depth, and
credibility. An example of the qualities sought in hiring analysts include the following:
-Intelligence-related experience, or a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university in an appropriate job-related field, such as political science, regional studies, international affairs (foreign language skill in conjunction with these majors is highly desired) geography, economics, engineering, or physical or life sciences.
-Research skills to collect and evaluate research data; to absorb and synthesize large amounts of information; to draw logical, interpretive conclusions; and to present those conclusions in a variety of formats and forums.
-Ability to convey ideas fully and accurately through discussions, briefings, and similar presentations.
-Personal attributes that include motivation, professional ethics, effective interpersonal skills, the potential for professional growth, and the ability to perform under pressure.25
The Joint Military Intelligence College published lntelliqence Essentials for Everyone, which included a chapter "Portrait of an Intelligence ~n a l~s t . "~~ The author uses several government studies to present the ideal characteristics of the intelligence analyst. The desired cognitive attributes include written expression, reading comprehension, inductive reasoning, pattern recognition, oral comprehension, and information ordering. Experienced supervisors judged reading comprehension, pattern recognition and deductive reasoning to be the most important abilities. Research also demonstrated the following personality traits most often seen in intelligence analysts: "orientation to the inner world of ideas rather than the outer world of things and people, tendency to gather factual information through senses rather than inspiration, proclivity to make decisions on the basis of logic rather than emotion, and an eagerness to seek closure proactively instead of leaving possibilities open.n27 While the above attributes and traits are not prescriptive or inclusive of intelligence analysts, they present one set of guidelines for supervisors or placement officers to help determine who among their work force may perform well in an analytical position.
Another opinion on qualities desirable in intelligence analysts comes from outside the intelligence community. George Friedman, president of STRATFOR, a private, for-profit intelligence think tank recruits analysts for their "ingenuity, moxie, and intellectual unconventionality rather than academic credential^"^^ Friedman stated, 'We want zero-based thinking and Zen detachment from our people. That means parking faddish academic beliefs and ideological preconceptions at the door."29 Terrorism analysts must be able to think out of the box and think the unthinkable. This ability is not innate for most people, and the intelligence community should focus efforts on looking for individuals who have succeeded in predictive analysis and bring them in to the terrorism analysis fold.
Besides meeting the challenge of finding good analysts, the intelligence community needs to have the best managers of analysis. Included in this management should be support for research to better understand the thought processes involved in making analytical judgments.
Management needs to understand the thinking skills involved in analysis and how to test job applicants for these skills and train analysts to improve them. 30 According to Richards Heuer's Psvcholoqv of Intellhence Analvsis, the intelligence community should hire experts on the thought process to continually improve intelligence, analytical products, and analysts themselves:
Scholars selected for tours of duty in the Intelligence Community should include cognitive psychologists or other scholars of various backgrounds who are interested in studying the thinking processes of intelligence analysts. There should also be post-doctoral fellowships for promising scholars who could be encouraged to make a career of research in this field. Over time, this would contribute to building a better base of knowledge about how analysts do andlor should make analytical judgments and what tools or techniques can help them.31
In essence, the community would be well-served by hiring people who think about thinking. These individuals could exponentially assist in the analytical effort by helping good analysts become better, and by helping identify which individuals within the community may be best suited for analytical work in the terrorism field.
THE SEARCH FOR EXPERIENCE
Former CIA inspector general Frederick Hitz recommends that to gather and analyze intelligence on the new enemy the community will need to go beyond books and "reach into the bazaars and the mosques of Pakistan and Palestine. And the only way to do that is to recruit the best people available, both from the great universities and from the streets of America's ethnic enclaves." He recommends a "crash" program to recruit and train employees in the hard languages: "As difficult as it may be to recruit an informant in a terrorist cell of individuals willing to expend their lives in suicide missions, it's impossible if you don't speak or read the language and understand the culture from which they come." Hitz also suggests recruiting from the American Islamic community now, as it will take years to build up the necessary expertise in both the operations directorate and analytical corps.32
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also cites the lack of language skills and area expertise as a notable challenge to adequately addressing the terrorism analysis analysts also leave, hired away by industry which offers more competitive financial, educational and retirement programs. In the current "war for people," changes must be made to draft the best officers.
The Strategic Investment Plan recognizes work force problems and states:
Depending on the analytic organization and the occupational discipline, there is a work force 'graying' (i.e. aging) and 'greening' (i.e., an influx of very young people) problem in the Intelligence Community. Some agencies have done little or no hiring over the past decade because of downsizing, the need to invest in research and development and technical systems, or an inability to acquire recruits with the desired skills. Senior personnel are retiring without being replaced with analysts having comparable knowledge, and some remaining veteran analysts possess skills that are outdated and less important in today's
To address some of the recruitment and retention issues, the SIP notes that the community must adopt new recruitment, hiring, and staffing processes and more flexible personnel management policies. As an example, all intelligence analysts should not be hired at the entry level. The SIP recommends establishing market-driven pay categories to recruit analysts in highly competitive skill areas. Other recommendations include increasing senior-and executive level hiring; expanding the use of time-limited appointments; expanding a tiered work force (mix of long-term careerists and short-term employees); and adding more annuitants, contractors and consultants. The SIP also saw rotational assignments as "one of the most important and rewarding components of career development."37 It recommends providing analysts meaningful rotational assignments, including those with academia, industry, government laboratories, and other federal agencies to build and sustain expertise and improve retention. Along with this will need to be a change in the current personnel system to reward those who take those rotational assignments. Complaints from various agency's employees within the intelligence community is that service away from their agency is viewed as "out of sight, out of mind," and upon returning to their parent agencies many have not been placed in challenging positions using their expertise gained from rotational assignments.
In a plan to grow and retain greater analytical expertise, the CIA'S Directorate of
Intelligence created a new career track to keep seasoned analysts from leaving analytical work for management. The Senior Analytic Service was created in March 2000, and analysts at the GS-13, 14, and 15 levels applied. The positions allowed additional pay, more professional "freedom," and greater promotion opportunitie~.~' This track also encourages analysts to continue working in their fields longer, retaining their seasoned experience and expertise. The intelligence community should ensure this initiative is adopted community-wide, not just at the CIA, to improve the overall cadre of intelligence analysts across subject areas.
The SIP acknowledges the importance of managing the human skill mix. It states that the intelligence community must develop empirical methods of determining current and future analytic resource requirements, determine the appropriate balance between in-house analysts and external experts, and adopt better processes for gathering data on intelligence community analytical skills and expertise. A "skills management track should accomplish the above.39
The skills management track could determine future manpower levels and assist managers in allocating current resources to best meet surge situations. The plan calls for establishing a community-wide analytic skills database to track and map expertise and performing a community-wide needs assessment to determine appropriate end strength. Part of the effort would also identify areas that could employ various types of external expertise, such as academics, industry partners, and an intelligence community reserve constituted of individuals who can be used to augment the analytic cadre during both normal and crisis operations.40
The SIP provides outstanding guidance for improving personnel aspects of the analytic community. The community would benefit by implementing its long term, or in other words, "strategic" plans, if it hopes to meet tomorrow's analytic challenges with the right work force.
Following is the SIP'S stated goal for investing in people: "To build and maintain a diverse work force that is second to none in its analytic discipline, regional and technical expertise, collection mastery, intellectual rigor, communications skills and knowledge of consumers needs."'
Training helps meet one of the plan's top objectives: investment in skills and expertise.
TRAINING: THE SCHOOL SOLUTION, EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND IDEAS
Even when the intelligence community recruits the best, the cadre improves through Another of the school's initiatives is the Kent Center, designed to maximize "in reach" and "outreach." A small number of Kent scholars are chosen from academia, the military, or personnel in policy jobs who have something they can contribute to the theory and practice of analysis. They are available to augment existing programs. The "in reach" portion is the equivalent of a sabbatical program, wherein analysts can study a particular issue or problem from several weeks to a year. Many of these areas are still being fleshed out, but the aim is to bring in more influence from outside the intelligence community to address analytical issues.
While the school was formed within the Directorate of Intelligence of CIA with the mission to educate and train its analysts, it has found that students learn best in a class that includes diversity. Students from DIA, NSA, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and some military commands have attended, although the numbers have been limited. The school does not charge "tuitionn for these students, but billet allocation has been a factor. Wagner discussed the proposal for a CIA University, and seems confident it will happen. He believes this will be good for the Kent School, and compared the Kent School to a college within a university system. The college will still be unique and have its own specialty, but the university system will help improve some of the collaboration and larger administrative issues. Among the school's many offerings are 24 different "Analytic Methods" courses ranging from basic analysis and production to scientific and technical analysis. 48 The intelligence community benefits from the training JMlC provides to a wide variety of analysts, enlisted, officer, and civilian, from a variety of agencies. Besides the obvious impact of better-trained employees, another benefit the intelligence community receives is the two-year obligation students incur following this school-several more years guaranteed serving in the intelligence field.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
Analysts learn from educators, trainers, and other analysts, but also benefit from exposure to customers and intelligence professionals in other areas of expertise. John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence stated that he feels in the CIA'S Directorate of Intelligence, the analysis is most relevant and useful when provided directly to the intelligence consumer, many times by a personal representative of the CIA. The agency has many analysts deployed to policy agencies and military commands. The representatives have proven very useful and popular because they offer "one stop shopping" and ensure the headquarters analysts remain close to customers. The representatives also provide useful feedback to headquarters and can help target specific needs."
Other agencies in the intelligence community could benefit from similar programs sending analysts to the "field," to gain experience working directly for the consumers rather than providing analysis to more analysts. The OfFice of Naval Intelligence has done this with success, embedding selected military and civilian analysts into field units for short-term and long-term assignments when appropriate. Both analysts and units benefit. One of the more successful programs is the "ship rider" program in which regional analysts augment an aircraft carrier intelligence center while transiting that area of operations. This symbiotic relationship helps the analysts see whom they support, and helps customers know whom they are turning to. This is just an example of one program in which analysts from both sides benefit5'. the U.S. Senate: "What will keep me awake at night in this job, is the things we haven't thought about." To address these thoughts, intelligence analysts need experience in "red teaming." A red team assumes the identity of the enemy and tries to outmaneuver the allies, or the blue team. These exercises help expose ideas that haven't previously been anticipated. The exercises help analysts try to empathize with a culture, think about their anger or concerns, and how they might react in particular sit~ations.~~ Former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey recommends new research be applied to the very real cyber terrorism threat, and key to that research should be people who "think like terrorists." He went on to say:
We need a kind of Red Team for some of the things that need to be done. We are really used to thinking about how our infrastructure might deal with natural disasters, but I quoted to them something that Einstein once said, 'God may be sophisticated, but he's not plain mean.' What I think Einstein meant by that...nature is on the other side of the fight. Nobody is there trying to outwit you. But when you are in a war, it is different. There is somebody plain mean on the other side. It's not just trying to protect the Internet against natural disasters, but trying to protect it against a very evil person who is smart and looking for ways to make it fail. It's going to take a whole new way of thinking to fight this new threat.53
The U.S. military uses varying versions of Red Team training and it is part of every unit's advanced training. The Army studies foreign military capabilities and includes those tactics and predicted capabilities into the "Red Force" fighting the U.S. Blue force in training scenarios.
These realistic training evolutions set at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, and other training bases even include foreign forces' equipment, uniforms, and tactics to best
prepare soldiers for what they may encounter. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force maintain "aggressor" aircraft squadrons to fly against U.S. pilots to effectively force them into solutions against the enemy. The U.S. intelligence community should use these type models to exercise terrorism analysts thinking skills, forcing them to think against the enemy in a practice scenario.
As soldiers and pilots learn new and effective tactics and techniques in practice maneuvers, so, too, can the intelligence analyst.
The NRO chartered a unique project named "Proteus," which encouraged out of the box thinking to try and determine solutions to national security problems of tomorrow. In describing the first phase of the project, David Kier, Deputy Director, NRO, stated:
The question for us, I think, is not how the future will unfold-we cannot predict that with clarity. We must wait until we get there to see how it turns out. The'. questions are, rather, how we can face the future, react to it, operate in it, and understand it. It is our posture that matters. For that, we must find new approaches to planning that affords us deeper looks at the shifting bedrock and not leave us reacting to aftershocks.
This document [the report on the first phase of the project] is unique in my experience in Government. It is neither an analysis, nor a plan for the future. Nor is it a guess at how the future will be. Rather, it is an unusually rich and thoughtful collection of insights about the problems of 2020. Specifically, it is about the problems that the U.S. Intelligence Community might face and how we might see the future through something other than the distorted lens of the present.54
This effort should be seen as a prototype to encourage analysts to think beyond the daily problems. With this effort, there was no penalty for being wrong. The project encouraged analysts to look at scenarios most had never envisioned and create intelligence solutions to solve the problems of those days. As far-fetched as that might seem, this is the type mental exercise our intelligence analysts can benefit from most. A sports analogy would be, one might never know they can run a 7:00minute mile if they never try. And it might be uncomfortable, but it might be right. And when that runner really needs to run the 7:00minute mile, at least they will have practiced it. The intelligence community needs to let analysts "exercise" their analytical capabilities in more forums such as "Proteus" before the big races. Red team training has increased in popularity over the past few years, but again, has suffered due to a lack of resources. Although "red teaming" is practiced today in the intelligence community, it can be greatly expanded and likely yield good results. The intelligence community as a whole could improve its relevancy and pertinence through a more focused and better-resourced red team effort at various levels.
SELF-STUDY
If for whatever reason analysts are too bogged down in the day-to-day operations that they are not able to attend formal training for some time, the intelligence community has done a good job of institutionalizing some of its best resources on intelligence analysis. Any serious career intelligence analyst who has not read Richards Heuer's Psycholoqy of lntelliqence Analvsis has let themselves down-if only for the fact that so many of their peers have read it.
Although self-study is not the preferred education'or training method for many, its value should not be underestimated. All analysts should read this book to help decipher the most difficult challenges of analysis-and terrorism analysis completely applies, as it requires thinking about thinking-arguably the hardest.
Heuer's work focuses on how people process information to make judgments on the basis of incomplete information. In the book's foreword, Douglas MacEachin, former Deputy Director of Intelligence emphasizes the following: "Dick Heuer makes clear that the pitfalls the human mental process sets for analysts cannot be eliminated; they are part of us. What can be done is to train people how to look for and recognize these mental obstacles, and how to develop procedures designed to offset them."55 Another former CIA officer feels the following Heuer passage summarizes his thoughts: "Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning process. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themse~ves."~~ In a book including chapters such as "Thinking About Thinking"; "Perception: Why Can't We See What Is There to Be Seen;" and "Analysis of Competing Hypotheses," it is clear that the work is "relatively timeless and still relevant to the never-ending quest for better analysis."57
Heuer influenced formal intelligence training as far back as the 1980s and many of his writings are still required readings in intelligence training courses today. The following is Heuer's advice to CIA leaders, managers and analysts, all of which must be learned through experience vice books:
Establish an organizational environment that promotes and rewards the kind of critical thinking he advocates-for example, analysis on difficult issues that considers in depth a series of plausible hypotheses rather than allowing the first credible hypothesis to suffice.
Expand funding for research on the role such mental processes play in shaping analytical judgments. An Agency that relies on sharp cognitive performance by its analysts must stay abreast of studies on how the mind works-i.e., on how analysts reach judgments.
Foster development of tools to assist analysts in assessing information. On tough issues, they need help in improving their mental models and in deriving incisive findings from information they already have; they need such help at least as much as they need more inf~rrnation.~~ "Equipment" also encompasses, for these purposes, analytical tools, and research into One of the six major pillars of the SIP was to build a framework and analytical tools to help analysts "manage information, reveal connections, facilitate analytic insights, streamline search, an automatically populate databa~es."~' The SIP strongly encouraged and endorsed collaborative efforts among intelligence community players to ensure intelligence was shared real time by the most efficient means possible. A goal was to ensure databases' accessibility and interoperability to enhance collaboration and leverage expertise across the intelligence community. It makes sense to create a collaborative working environment to link analysts and connect them to collectors, customer, allies, and outside experts. Although these were the goals of the plan, they have not so far been easily met.
IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Good intelligence is useless if it cannot be shared, analyzed, or fused with other sources, and the intelligence community fails to share intelligence information effectively. Intentions are good, and progress is made, but the reality is that all elements of the community are not where they need to be yet. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI):
Effective sharing of information among the various components of the government-wide effort to combat terrorism is also essential, and is presently hindered by cultural, bureaucratic, resource, training, and in some cases, legal obstacles. The Bremer Commission [The National Commission on Terrorism] noted that {t)he law enforcement community is neither fully exploiting the growing amount of information it collects during the course of terrorism investigations not distributing that information effectively to analysis and policymakers.n61
The House Permanent Select committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) has also cited the intelligence community for failing to share information among community members."
The Bremer Commission discusses the traditional reluctance of the law enforcement agencies to share information outside their areas so as not to jeopardize prosecutions. The Commission recognizes that the FBI shares information about specific terrorist threats with other agencies, but feels there is far more information collected in field offices that could provide long-term value to the intelligence community if shared. They recommend the FBI establish and equip a dedicated staff of reports officers, similar to the CIA'S, to review, prioritize and distill information for timely dissemination to other agencies within the intelligence community. The Commission felt the intelligence-sharing issue important enough to warrant Attorney General attention, with the following recommendation: "The Attorney General should clarify what information can be shared and direct maximum dissemination of terrorist-related information to policymakers and intelligence analysts consistent with the law.n63
The new anti-terrorism bill, known as the U.S.A. Patriot Act, passed allowing the FBI to gather domestic intelligence and the Treasury Department to build a financial intelligencegathering system-both of whose data can be accessed by the CIA. The new bill provides the intelligence community access to information and intelligence gathering opportunities previously restricted to only the law enforcement community. The new law'permits the FBI to give grand jury information to the CIA without a court order, as was previously required. The only restriction is that the information must concern foreign intelligence or international terrorism.
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft called the anti-terrorism bill "a package of tools urgently needed to combat terrorism," and Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the SSCI, called it "empowerment of the Director of Central ~ntelli~ence."~~ The DCI has taken broad steps to improve intelligence sharing since September I I th. In a memo to his staff, DCI George Tenet directed employees to "cut out bureaucratic impediments to success," because intelligence handling "must be absolutely seamless in waging this war, and we must lead." 65 His memo also said, "all the rules have changed ...It here] must be absolute full sharing of ideas and capabilities ...law enforcement, military and other civilian agencies and other intelligence community colleagues.n66 Additionally, cross-pollination between agencies is being enforced at the highest levels. Since September I lth, Joan Dempsey, Deputy DCI for Community Management has chaired daily intelligence community conferences with representatives from the DIA, NSA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. And to ensure the FBI and CIA are fully exchanging information, CTC officials meet twice daily with FBI Director Robert S. Mueller and his deputies.67 The renewed efforts by the agencies to seriously share information are clearly demonstrated from the top. It is logical to assume that analysis will improve once analysts have access to all the information, rather than selected parts.
SCIENTISTS, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY
The scientific and research communities are taking an active role in looking for ways to prevent future terrorist events. September 26,2001 , the directors of the National Academy of Science, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine hosted a summit 22 with some of the country's top scientific minds to look for ways their work could help fight terrorism threats. The directors began the project on their own and will be forwarding some of their ideas and recommendations to the Office of Homeland Security. They hope to both look at short-term vulnerabilities and develop a group of scholars who are willing to think out of the box at ways to predict and solve the problems. One of the first projects they decided to tackle was to make a list of the risks, and then develop "a clear scientific approach to assess the probability and consequences of various terror scenario^."^^ This scientific application to scenarios could prove very useful to intelligence analysts as another tool in the kit.
One solution to a previously identified problem in the analytical corps may have solutions in the technology field: virtual language translation. The SSCl explained the problem as follows:
The Committee is concerned that intelligence in general, and intelligence related to terrorism in particular, is increasingly reliant on the ability of the intelligence Community to quickly, accurately and efficiently translate information in a large number of languages. Many of the languages for which translation capabilities are limited within the United States Government are the languages of critical importance in our counter terrorism efforts. The Committee believes that applying cutting-edge, internet-like technology to create a 'National Virtual Translation Center' can alleviate this problem .... Foreign intelligence could be collected technically in one location, translated in a second location, and provided to an lntelligence Community analyst in a third location.69
Regardless of whether this virtual translation is done at a center or within existing intelligence community structures, this type of technology needs to move to the forefront of research and development initiatives to at least help address the demanding language requirements of the War on Terrorism. The step forward in virtual translation, though, needs to be a cautious one. There are numerous examples, both internal and external to the intelligence community, where bad translations lead to even worse analysis. And with the stakes so high, the technological translation tool cannot quickly or easily replace the human translation machine.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN ANALYTICAL TOOLS
The CIA has tapped private-sector development companies such as In-Q-Tel in Silicon
Valley to develop information technology (IT) the agency can use. "We're looking at real Mission Impossible stuff," according to Gilman G. Louie, president of l n -~-~e l ? O In-Q-Tel was founded in 1999 as an independent, private, nonprofit company chartered by the CIA to identify and deliver information technology solutions to support critical intelligence missions. The idea was to combine the entrepreneurs of the private-sector knowledge management community with talents of the CIA workforce to solve agency information technology problems. Some of the In-Q-Tel work included technologies such as Internet search and discovery, information security, enterprise knowledge management, and geospatial applications. They have also built a large network of companies that have ideas to offer the agency.71 Terrorism intelligence analysts will hopefully be partnered with these technologists to apply their combined expertise to the difficult analytical framework of the terrorism problem.
Applied Systems Intelligence (ASI) in Roswell, GA, provides another example of technology applied to the analytical issue in the form of intelligence analysis software.
KARNAC (Knowledge Aided Retrieval in Activity Context), designed by ASI, will be able to sift through and analyze existing public and private databases finding suspicious patterns of activity.
Its creators say the software will help analysts predict terrorist attacks. In its current configuration, information would come from databases such as gun registrations, driver's licenses, criminal records, the Internet, newspapers and county records. The computer assists
by sifting large quantities of data and connecting pieces of information that may not have much impact on their own by together could be important. Although not foolproof, the data KARNAC claims to use in tests is the same information the FBI has identified as significant information after other terrorist events.72 Technologically driven tools such as this concept could help analysts by presenting possible scenarios, which could then be processed by human analytical thought.
And even if the proper intelligence is collected, there is no guarantee that the right information will get to the right analyst in time. The information explosion placed a true strain on the "Exploitation" phase of the Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED)
problem. There are some estimates that only 10 percent of collected data is actually analyzed.
Consider the following figures as a basis: in 2000, Americans logged 2.58 billion minutes on cell phones, 75 percent more than in 1999; America Online handles 225 million e-mails and 1 .I billion instant messages a day. This massive increase in data is driving some of the research into "fuzzy logic"-computing looking for patterns or words suggesting a terrorist action. This could assist, but it will still be extremely difficult to keep up with the influx of data that information technology has brought. Former U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton, who once chaired the HPSCl stated: " The key in intelligence is always getting the right information to the right person at the right time.
[Otherwise] you can have a warehouse of information, and it doesn't do you any good.n73 The information explosion by itself demonstrates the need for more analysts, better training, and better tools to cull the right information.
CONCLUSION
"Above all, we must never lose sight of the core mission -to warn and protect the people of the United States in a world that still holds enormous potential for surprise and danger. Analysis is not sexy work. No movies will be made about it. But it is the most important work to be done, and not enough money or attention is paid to it. If reforms are going to be made, we would urgently hope that they would be made in elevating the standing of analysis in the intelligence community.76
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